Introduction
The history of relations between Māori and Pākehā 2 casts a shadow over contemporary politics and lawmaking in Aotearoa New Zealand. For example, when in opposition, the centre-right National Party sought to reduce the 2005 general election debate to a 'Kiwi/iwi' duality, 3 effectively demonising the Labour-led government for its alleged privileging of Māori over Pākehā interests. Paradoxically, the extinguishment of indigenous customary rights via the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 4 led to a schism in 1 The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers whose comments greatly improved this article. Any errors are solely attributable to the authors. 2 'Pākehā' means 'a non-Polynesian New Zealand-born New Zealander especially if pale-skinned' (Orsman 1997: 567) . King (1999: 10) argues that the term 'simply denotes people and influences that derive originally from Europe but which are no longer "European." Pakeha is an indigenous expression to describe New Zealand people and expressions of culture that are not Maori.' In this article, the term will be restricted to the meaning contemplated by King. 3 'Kiwi' denotes a New Zealander and 'probably originally applied to white males' (Orsman 1997: 414) . While noting the possibility of Eurocentric categorising, iwi is usually translated as 'people' (Belgrave et al 2005: 394) , 'tribe' or 'a people recognising a common eponymous ancestor' (Orsman 1997: 375) . Māori may also be referred to as tangata whenua (people of the land or a given place) and Pākehā as tangata tiriti (people of the Treaty). 4 In Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa (2003) , the Court of Appeal (the then highest domestic court) held that the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court (Te Kooti Whenua Māori), which hears matters relating to Māori land, extended to the foreshore and seabed. This decision indicated that some customary rights could trump the Crown's assumption of radical title to all land in New Zealand. In reaction, the Labour-led government (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) enacted the Foreshore and Seabed Act that vested in the Crown full legal and beneficial ownership of the public foreshore and seabed, to preserve it in perpetuity for the people of New Zealand. See Boast (2005) for an analysis of the case and the legislative reaction. As part of the Forests Fisheries and other properties' (the Treaty 1840: art 2). 5 The settlers' means of acquiring land is an obvious root cause of tension; but, we argue, concepts of time and law in colonial New Zealand, particularly in relation to land, may also contribute to an understanding of the contemporary relevance of persistent problems. Friedman notes, ' [A] nthropology is born out of the ideological representation of the center/periphery/margins structure of our civilization as an evolutionary relation which was elected as the lead party of government in 2008, the Foreshore and Seabed Act has been subject to a Ministerial Review. The review panel has recommended that 'the Act must be repealed' (Durie et al 2009: 152) but no decision has been made by the government. 5 In accordance with orthodox legal doctrine, the Treaty is an international treaty concluded between two sovereign nations. While the principles of customary public international law are incorporated into the common law, the provisions of a treaty only apply domestically (as opposed to between the countries themselves) when the provisions are legislated (Joseph 2001: 61 between civilization and its less developed forerunners, a mistranslation of space into time' (Friedman 1994: 5) . In a secondary sense, this exploration delineates how the pathway to alternative histories from the postcolonial present might be redrawn by revealing the mechanism of historical appropriation as based on the concept of spatiotemporal occlusion. J.G.A. Pocock argues, 'If we look at the paradigm of appropriation from the state of nature, the two things we ought to notice are that it was constructed by jurists and that the technology it presupposes is the heavy plough ' (2001: 42) . But
Pocock omits the fourth dimension from the paradigm of appropriation in the colonies-the 'technologies of time'-which separated the appropriators and the dispossessed in terms of spatio-temporal dislocation.
This article first outlines the dissonance between European and Māori conceptions of time, revealing a disconnection 'between the old ways and the new' (Pearce 2003: 13) .
Second, we consider the relationship between time and law. Third, we apply the interlinked concepts of law and time to land. Finally, we consider how postcolonial jurisprudence seeks to engage with historical problems in New Zealand, and air the possibility of a counter history.
Conceptions of time
Henri Bergson recognised that notions of time are culturally specific. Developing Kant's (1781) idea that space is endowed with an existence independent of its content, he postulated that time is a social construction involving the manipulation of the phenomenality and materiality of space. Time and space are malleable because the empirical experience of the physical world and abstract ideas coincide: 'The empirical or genetic explanations have thus taken up the problem of space at the very point where Kant left it: Kant separated space from its contents: the empiricists ask how these contents, which are taken out of space by thought, manage to get back again' (Bergson 1889: 93) . Bergson (95) further proposed that, given human differences and the interpretation of culture-specific 'local signs,' simultaneous experiences of time are never identical. Such dissonance arises from the 'diversity of the organic elements which they effect' and brings into question the idea of time as a clear homogeneous medium. Thus, the experience of time and space for the individual and in the social sense are no more located 'within human consciousness than without it' and are themselves a work of time and space. Unlike cyclical time, the concept of linear time is independent of natural processes and permits ideas of history as sequestered intervals (Greenhouse 1989 (Greenhouse : 1637 . Linear time is an intellectual construct that enables measurement in noncyclical ways and also contains ideas of singularity, uniqueness and supremacy. As Carol Greenhouse (1989) suggests, in borrowing the notion of time in relation to eternity from the church, secular temporal discourse located time as something independent from individual experience. Linear time also permits ideas of universal progress. Thus, Māori, because of their premodern lifestyle, could be consigned to a 'fictitious' past-a 'denial of coevalness,'
Barrett and Strongman
which Johannes Fabian refers to as the 'allochronism of anthropology ' (2002: 32) .
Conceiving global history in terms of universal progress, this allochronic logic identified and constituted nineteenth-century 'savages' as 'survivals,' inhabitants of more or less ancient stages of cultural development. Victorian colonial discourse, which incorporated, inter alia, notions of time and religious doctrine, effectively relegated
Māori to a pre-modern past, and thereby justified European cultural ascendancy through a claim to spatio-temporal legitimacy. This discourse was based on the excentric agency of modernity and the rule of law. Linear time also acted to 'seal off' or separate the 'object' of Māori from the time of observation, rendering Māori culture as 'frozen' or 'taken out of time' (Thomas 1996: 2) . At the same time, allochronism established a 'civilised' West as the pinnacle of universal human progress, an argument that helped legitimise various imperialist projects (Bunzl 2002: xi-xii Christianity was thus co-opted as the discourse enabling Māori access to modernity, and Christianity, in turn, became a sub-text of historical loss and occlusion. Furthermore, pre-and post-conversion practices could be compared in a way that revealed traditions as 'uncivilised,' if not 'diabolical.' Thus Richard Boast quotes Nopera Te Ngiha, a rangatira (chief) of the Nga Toa iwi, admitting in 1868 'that before the advent of Christianity Maori had kept slaves, but stressed that this was "in Satan's time," before the coming of the Gospel' (1998: 11).
Western temporal structures inevitably became the pre-eminent rationales of social organisation in European colonies. Indeed, as Polack (1840: accountability derives from the capacity to remember deeds of the past and to take responsibility for them (Brunner 2006: 293) . The individualised 'ought' of positive law is no longer coterminous with the 'is' of the group under customary law.
For Greenhouse (1989 Greenhouse ( : 1631 , the law manifests a flexible symbolism as a means of social control, which is by definition complete, yet its completeness does not preclude change. Indeed, the law's regulatory function should not be discounted from a progressive political perspective. Law can enact a restorative form of social regulation such as with bodies established to address historical grievances, for example, the Waitangi Tribunal. Greenhouse (1989 Greenhouse ( : 1631 also points out that the law's legitimacy is partly derived from an historical secularisation of the sacred quality of time that locates the end of time outside of collective experience. Law manifests timelessness in that legal systems may carry out some regulatory functions under the sign of justice. Justice, like time, is, in part, a transcending ideal. If the endpoint of law in time is neither fixed nor envisioned, symbolically it is coterminous with national life, which it interprets in temporal terms.
Constitution of the other
Karl Popper argued that since no society can far-predict its future states of knowledge, there can be neither a predictive science of human history nor an historical determinism.
Expressed in his notion of the 'politics of time,' for Popper (1945; 1963) , 'society' in the collective selects and orders the facts of history in a self-correcting manner. As The regulatory function of law acts as a system for temporal control by placing limits on the pace at which the traffic of commerce and human flow is carried out in society.
Therefore much of colonial lawmaking served to disallow the cultural memory of the colonised, to place it out of the bounds of law, to de-temporalise it, or to reinterpret it only under the cultural system of the colonised. It may have been too difficult or troublesome to seek to comprehend the Māori view of time and its relationship to the inhabitancy of space during the process of colonisation. In their determination to occupy the present, it seems the colonisers overlooked one of the principal characteristics of law-its Lockean backward looking temporal logic-or rather they refused to acknowledge this capacity in Māori culture. By retrospectively privileging the European social system, 8 colonial law disengaged Māori from their own spatial-temporal understanding in a revolutionary way. Law, or rather the political force that impels it, is thus sometimes one of revolution: this is true of the imposition of European law in colonies or any other situation in which one set of beliefs are swept aside by another, or in a situation whereby only one set of beliefs become legitimated when two or more are in view. In New Zealand this 'quiet revolution' was asserted over tribal norms by the The Treaty of Waitangi (Brookfield 2006: 18 Wakefield.' Time should not be necessary in utopia but spatial relationships make it so.
The Wakefieldian solution was to invest in colonies that might reproduce the social advantages of the source country, in a space large enough to alleviate the effects of competition. However, as Lamb (1999: 88) points out:
Wakefield was committing a circuit of illegal, or at least non-legal, transactions: he was issuing stock in a company that had no tradeable asset but a speculative land-purchase; he was acquiring land for trifles from Maori who were ignorant of the terms of European sale; and he was arranging for settlement on land in New Zealand, which, even if it had been fairly bought, had no basis in law, since the territory lay in a foreign country in which the British Crown had declared no interest, and with which it had not yet signed a treaty.
Arguably, Wakefield's utopianism is oblivious to the Hobbesian idea of law as a scientifically planned regulatory system which allows future-orientated, continuous security: Hobbes's social contract is a spatio-temporal negotiation between desires and their realisation in which future satisfactions are contracted in a trade-off between the attainment of desire and social control in the present.
When conceived of in this way, law is the instrument of utopianism. By moderating harmful desires in the present, law may produce future happiness. However, the law was also an instrument of division. Whilst a strong congruence may be claimed between the politics and lawmaking, colonial ideology and a cultural experience of time, the notion of a temporal horizon is not confined to European culture, though linear time may be distinguished from organic or circular time. For Yacouba Konaté, the division between Country,' which referred to the sublime landscape of New Zealand and implied an element of Puritanism towards it in the settlers' minds. Richard Seddon, New Zealand's premier between 1893 and 1906, popularised the term (Orsman 1997: 300).
past and future is substantiated by an 'asymmetrical principle' in which time may be part of social design in which 'it is necessary to depart from projects, from factual programs, in order to detach virtually from the real present and introduce a discontinuity while realising a series of retentions between present and past ' (1996: 149) . So, thinking about time involves a conceptual divisiveness that lends itself readily to legal categorisations.
Such a mechanistic view sees law as an independent arbiter regulating human needs and desire in social space (Brunner 2006: 305) . Law primarily shapes futures but also expresses historical consciousness. This is an empiricist secular temporal view that regulates human action toward the future. It is also premised on the idea that the past is equivocated; yet much of law conducted under secular time depends on reassessing past wrongs, in effect, of reinterpreting history so that a different, more just view prevails.
This has been the essential task of postcolonial jurisprudence in New Zealand.
Māori land rights
The power of European nations to intercede in the temporal inhabitancies of colonial space became juridified as the doctrines of an imperial common law were developed during the eighteenth century. In the Anonymous ( (1992) in Australia, where no treaty existed, and in R v Van der Peet (1996) in Canada, each of which development reaffirmed some concept of native title (Walters 2001: 137) .
Land and the Treaty
Article 2 By guaranteeing interests in land as they existed in 1840, an allochronism was created.
Whereas settlers enjoyed individual property rights and could engage in free market exchanges, Māori interests in land were preserved in legal aspic as exotic curios, despite the clear ability of customary law to evolve in order to take into account changing circumstances. The long-term effects of this approach have been significant. Thus, until recently, in aboriginal title discourse, common law courts have emphasised and recognised the 'native title of usufruct,' 11 whereas 'Government has unilaterally rejected any possibility of Māori exclusive or ownership interests' (Williams 2005: 381) . Since 10 A more important point is made by Williams (1989: 83) : while commentators commonly emphasise how the Treaty affirmed the Crown's right of pre-emption, the Treaty 'was primarily about the maintenance of Māori title to their lands-not its extinguishment.' 11 Justinian, the Roman jurisconsult, defined usufruct (ususfructus) as 'the right to use and enjoy the things of another, their substance remaining unimpaired' (Thomas 1976: 203) . The usufruct, as such, has not been received into English land law.
Māori were obliged to sell their land to the Crown under the Treaty, a monopsony market was created in terms of which government could effectively determine the prices paid for land. By 1860, 'Māori title to nearly two-thirds of the country was extinguished' on this basis (Boast 2008: 26) . accelerated with a concomitant hastening of amalgamation and assimilation of Māori 12 As Sinclair (1957) indicates, these conflicts were historically referred to as the 'Māori Wars' but, more recently, and particularly following the success of Belich (1986) and an ensuing television series, as the 'New Zealand Wars.' However, as Keenan (2002: 107) observes, 'Of all issues that then weighed heavily upon Maori, none was as important as the fate of the land. This is why Maori have viewed the wars as "Nga Pakanga Whenua O Mua-the Land Wars."' 13 Under English law, the Crown is assumed to hold radical title to all land. While a grant of freehold is practically equivalent to ownership, technically, it is a form of tenancy (Megarry & Wade 1984: 12) .
into a colony, driven by 'genuine, if blinkered, idealism' (Boast 2008: xv) . Boast (2004: 72) argues 'no evidence [exists] that Māori regretted the demise of Crown pre-emption and there is some evidence of Māori support for the right to sell on the free market.'
Nevertheless, in the light of the evidence of dispossession it caused, policy predicated on the Crown exiting the Māori land market was abandoned by 1869 (Boast 2008: 6) , and, Crown pre-emption was formally reintroduced by the Native Land Court Act 1894.
In R v Symonds (1847), Judge Chapman held that native title was 'entitled to be respected' and not extinguished without indigenous consent. However, English law (and settler politics) determined how far native title was to be respected. Before 1865, Māori had two options: to subsist or to sell their land to the Crown, but were precluded from becoming landlords. After 1865, they were subject to the untrammelled ambitions of a settler government and the irreversibility of free-market transactions. What was not available was a legal system that recognised Māori customs as parallel law or which equitably developed New Zealand common law as a synthesis of Māori and English norms. In the first regard, although there were never separate courts of law and equity in New Zealand, until 1873 the administration of common law and equitable jurisdictions were separate in the United Kingdom. Even after merger of the administration, as Patricia Loughlan notes, 'There was no merger of equitable and common law rules and principles, no joining of substantive legal and equitable doctrines and no alteration of legal and equitable principles ' (1996: 21-22 ). In W. Ashburner's famous metaphor, 'the two streams of jurisdiction, though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters' (cited by Loughlan 1996: 22) . There was, then, ample precedent of English law accommodating distinctly different normative systems within one overall framework of law and justice but only within the terms set by British Parliament.
Differing conceptions of transactions
Māori may have sought to incorporate Europeans into their communities, out of courtesy or to avoid conflict that might result in the alienation or appropriation of their land. They may have welcomed cultural exchange. As Margaret Mutu explains, Māori 'had decided that their people could benefit from the knowledge, skills and goods that Europeans could offer ' (1999: 319) . In land dealings made before 1840 and for some time after, argues Alan Ward (1973: 29) , Māori may have believed they were granting rights of occupancy, or may have included land 'disputed with neighbouring hapu [subtribe, extended family group]' or 'recently conquered and tenuously held.' Māori customary tenure was based on a different concept of inhabitancy from the individual title of the common law. As Aileen Moreton-Robinson expresses the aboriginal worldview, 'Although the concept "property" commonly refers to things owned by persons, or the rights of persons with respect to a thing, it is more than a relationship to the tangible and material. It embraces metaphysical and intangible rights ' (2005: 126) .
Waerete Norman explains that a claim to land 'was fixed at the outset when people bestowed their mana on the land by naming it after themselves or after some event enhancing their mana [authority, prestige, pride, or status]' whereas physical control 'was secured by the process of "ahi kā" (keeping the fires of occupation burning)'
(1999: 200-1). According to McHugh (1991: 74) dispossession through migration could take as many as three generations as the 'fire became cold' (ahi mātaotao).
The custom of tuku whenua was widely practised in pre-colonial New Zealand, in terms of which, tribal leaders who held the mana whenua for the tribe could allocate lands for a particular individual and his family for them to live on and use' (Mutu 1999: 319) .
'The mana whenua (that is, very approximately, the spiritual power and authority for the lands vested by the gods in a tribe, in particular, its chief) remained always in the tribe' (318, footnotes omitted). As Māori engaged with settlers, whom they might have presumed to be sojourners, the practice of tuku whenua was extended in respect of land 'for the use of a particular European and his descendants' (318). After the Treaty and the declaration of Crown pre-emption, Mutu (1999: 319) observes,
The nature of the land transactions changed in one essential respect. They were still tuku whenua, but the agreements being entered into by the tribes were no longer with individual Europeans. The tribes were now dealing with the Queen of England, the highest chief of all English chiefs, and hence, also the paramount chief of all incoming settlers … There would have been no reason to have any misgivings about entrusting a person of such high rank with lands for her subjects for as long as she and her descendants were kings and queens of England.
Māori would not, then, have seen any inconsistency between their own continued access and 'radical title' to land and the exercise of rights by a newcomer. Ironically, whereas imperial common law has traditionally restricted aboriginal title to use-rights, this may have been precisely the nature of the privileges Māori presumed they were extending to Europeans.
The arrangements hapū (sub-tribes or extended family group) initiated concerning land highlighted the gulf between Māori concepts of the nature of their relations with settlers and the latter's perception of such relationships. From the Māori perspective, transactions with early traders and missionaries were almost certainly personal, and, later, Māori continued to believe that the government could not introduce a third party to the land who had not been approved by them (Durie 1996: 461) . But bad faith is not required for inter-cultural misunderstanding to arise, as Durie (1996: 457) The plains and the mountains are being removed from under our feet; the hundred pathways of Heretaunga are being trampled by angry greedy people. Soon all we may have left will be the sea and the beaches although even now Pakeha covet our fish, drain the waters that feed the sea, and take away the rocks and sand…the ocean is in danger of being taken like the rest of the whenua [land]. (2005: 159) 
Time and the Treaty revisited
Contemplating colonial New Zealand law, it is easier to identify breaches of Māori land rights, confiscations and fraudulent purchases, than to recognise policies that made
Māori culture victim of a worldview that incorporated social and symbolic measures dissimilar from their own (Parsonson 2001: 173) . Nevertheless, the effect of policies, There are, then, at least two separate histories or synchronicities that meet their diachronic point in each enactment following the deliberations of the Tribunal-a history of remembering that is also forward-looking, and one of forgetting that may or may not involve a culture of assimilation. These narratives are defined by cultural and political as well as sociological differences (Byrnes 2006: 2) . The Tribunal interprets the Treaty as functioning as a distributive contract that is suspended between enduring cultural values and their demographic proportions. As M.P.K Sorrenson observes, 'so long as the Tribunal retains its retrospective jurisdiction to 1840, it will continue to recover a hitherto largely submerged Māori history of loss of resources and mana, supposedly protected by the Treaty. The Tribunal's findings may not be palatable to many New Zealanders, but it would be perilous to ignore them ' (1989: 177) .
Conclusion
In the face of European settlement, 'indigenous peoples did not stand idly by, give up or become passive objects; instead they resisted, temporised, changed, adapted, tried to exploit the European presence to get even with traditional enemies, adopted Christianity and in some ways made it their own, changed their material culture, and even defined and invented or reinvented themselves' (Boast 2008:16) . Nevertheless, time was fractured, and Māori adaptation to European ways meant adoption of European concepts of time. Colonial law created a division between the agents and beneficiaries of modernity by regulating as far as possible the pace of Māori adoption of the newly transplanted European culture. Being effectively outside of time meant the space of the tangata whenua (people of the land) could be occluded also (Durie 1996: 34) . If Locke foresaw the need to devise a political structure able to cope with the fallacies and mistakes that result from human misadventure, it would seem fair to say that such a structure was not established in colonial New Zealand. The frontier mentality of settlement conflicted with the politics of nation formation and created the possibilities for temporal disadvantage.
Could things have been different; was a result other than domination by colonial law possible? To pose such questions is not to invite imaginative speculation but rather to consider how the terms of the Treaty should have been actuated in relation to the normative systems of indigenes and settlers. Ani Mikaere observes that 'Tikanga Māori was the first law of Aotearoa ' (2005: 153) , and, for Durie (1996: 39) it is New
Zealand's original lex situs (the law of the place property is situated). In his view, the Treaty guaranteed Māori their own laws, just as the English were guaranteed theirs. This is not a revisionist fancy. The English Laws Act 1858 provided that the laws of England applied only 'so far as applicable to the circumstances of New Zealand'; indeed, measures were taken in the colony's early years to accommodate notions of collective responsibility-so alien to European individualism yet so natural to the Māori sense of community (Patterson 1992) . These measures had been abandoned by 1858, a casualty of the feud between Attorney-General William Swainson and George Clarke (a missionary appointed Chief Protector of Aborigines) over the establishment of Native Districts. As Ward (1973: 61) notes, 'The declaration of Native Districts would also have involved a de facto acceptance of the Maori social system, and allowed Maori people to adapt to the Western world, at a pace and manner more of their choosing.'
Furthermore, early laws provided the option for different regions to create locally appropriate laws, although this opportunity was never taken up. There is also the practical issue of recognition of law. Thus Belich (1996: 224) observes that 'even in the late 1860s, when the power balance had shifted considerably in favour of the Pakeha, a great many Maori did not consider themselves obliged to obey Pakeha law when it did not suit.'
There were, then, in the early colonial period two sets of laws involving different peoples and different ontologies of time. It is likely that, at the signing of the Treaty, these were intended-at least on the part of Māori-to co-exist, and indeed, it is plausible that they could have done so. In the event, the alien system prevailed when it could have co-existed, and the concepts of transcendental symbolism, which united the 
